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EXIT FROM THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
FEDERICO CILIBERTO and RICHARD C. LINDROOTH*
We study the exit of hospitals from the market for inpatient services. More
generous hospital reimbursement significantly reduces the probability of exit
throughout the 1990s. Conditional on reimbursement levels, hospital efficiency was
not a significant determinant in the early 1990s but in the mid- to late 1990s, less
efficient hospitals were significantly more likely to exit. Throughout the period,
high-tech services increased the probability of survival, and for-profit hospitals
were more likely to exit. The role of Medicare as a determinant of exit became
less important in the latter half of the 1990s. (JEL I11, L11)
I. INTRODUCTION
The hospital industry has experienced sig-
nificant changes in both reimbursement and
technology over the past 20 years. Changes
in both the level and type (e.g., per diem versus
prospective) of reimbursement have occurred
with all major payers. In addition, the demand
for inpatient care has declined due to utiliza-
tion management by managed care organiza-
tions and technological advances that have
facilitated a shift toward treatment in outpa-
tient settings. At the same time the industry
has experienced significant exit and consolida-
tion. Over the time period of this study (1989–
97) almost 350 short-term general hospitals
exited the inpatient hospital industry. In this
article, we examine the characteristics of clos-
ing hospitals and study whether the factors
that influence closure have changed over the
decade of the 1990s.
We expect the factors behind closure to
change over the time period for several rea-
sons. First, the relative generosity of payment
from different payers shifted over the time
period. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, re-
imbursement by Medicaid and Medicare was
relatively less generous compared to private
payers. Furthermore, the hospital industry
was adapting to the shift from to prospective
payment to cost-based reimbursement, which
began with Medicare and spread to other
insurers during this time period. However,
by the mid- to late 1990s, after the market
adjusted to changes in the way hospitals were
reimbursed, managed care pushed reimburse-
ment of privately insured patients to histori-
cally low levels in many markets. Thus, the
relative generosity of Medicaid and Medicare
payments increased in the latter half of the
period. Second, managed care also shifted a
larger portion of risk to mainly urban hospi-
tals in the latter half of the 1990s through cap-
itation. Under prospective payment, hospitals
are reimbursed at a fixed rate based on a
patient’s diagnosis. In contrast, hospitals are
reimbursed based on the number of enrollees
in the managed care plan under capitation.
Capitation shifts more risk onto hospitals,
and those that are most effective at managing
the risk aremore likely to be successful. Finally,
the technological substitutability between in-
patient and outpatient care increased through-
out the period. Thus the economic climate for
hospitals that performed inpatient and outpa-
tient surgeries was more favorable at the end
of the period.
Several previous empirical studies of exit
have tested Ghemawat and Nalebuff’s (1985,
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1990) prediction that in an oligopolistic mar-
ket for a homogenous good whose demand
is declining, survival is inversely related to
size.1 Deily (1991) found no evidence of a sim-
ple inverse relationship between a plant’s size
and exit. Rather, proxies of a plant’s profit-
ability were important in determining which
plants survived the contraction of the steel
industry, thus supporting the neoclassical
theory that long-run expected profit deter-
mine whether a plant will exit. Gibson and
Harris (1996) also find that larger, lower cost,
and older plants are less likely to exit an
industry.2
The focus of previous empirical studies of
hospital exit, however, has not been on testing
competing theories of exit but describing the
characteristics of hospital that close. Most
likely this is because hospitals, with their many
unique features, are ill-suited to testing general
theories of exit. For example, the hospital in-
dustry is populated by government, nonprofit,
and for-profit firms. We expect for-profit hos-
pitals to be more likely to exit because not only
do they compare uses of capital across several
industries but they are also unable to credibly
commit to remaining in a market with excess
capacity, as shown in Wedig et al. (1989). In
contrast, non–federal government and many
nonprofit hospitals have alternative sources
of funding that can sustain them through a
marketwide shakeout.
In their study of small hospitals between
1985 and 1988, Williams and colleagues (1992)
found that financial variables (total margin,
costs, and revenues) are significant determi-
nants of hospital closure and that public
hospitals are less likely to close than other
hospitals. Williams and colleagues also find
that rural hospitals providing fewer services
and surgeries are more likely to close. Using
a sample of all hospitals between 1986 and
1991,Deily and colleagues (2000) studywhether
the hospitals that exit the market are the least
efficient and find that the effect of their mea-
sureof inefficiencydifferedsystematicallyamong
different ownership types. Less efficient for-
profit and private not-for-profit hospitals were
shown to be more likely to exit than their effi-
cient counterparts. Deily and colleagues (2000)
is the first study that relates a measure of the
technicalefficiencytoclosure, thoughtheymea-
sure efficiency using a stochastic frontier cost
function. Finally, Lindrooth and colleagues
(2003) measure the effect of hospital closure
on the costs of the remaining hospitals in the
local market and find that closing hospitals
had higher costs and that the reduction in
capacity in the market led to a further reduc-
tion in market cost. They tie this latter result
to the cost of an empty bed.
Our analysis is different from previous
studies on exit in several ways. First, we use
panel rather than cross-sectional data, so we
are able to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity and state dependence using a random
effect logit specification. Second, we use di-
rect measures of total costs, revenues, outputs,
and capacity, so we are able to separately iden-
tify the role of excess capacity from that of
costs and revenues on the decision to exit. Third,
we identify the regression equations through
differences within the same industry across
local markets, rather than using differences
across industries, as in Gibson and Harris
(1996).
Our analysis shows that efficiency and re-
imbursement are critical determinants of exit—
hospitals that are less efficient and provide
services with lower reimbursement are more
likely to exit. This finding supports the neo-
classical theory that efficiency determines
the order of exit of plants in a declining indus-
try. We also find that differentiation into out-
patient and high-tech services decreased the
likelihood of exit throughout the time period.
Hospitals that adapt to the changing demand
for their services are more likely to survive.
Third, we find that not-for-profit hospitals
are less likely to exit than for-profit hospitals.
This supports the notion that the exit thresh-
old of for-profit hospitals is higher than that
of nonprofit hospitals. This is likely because
for-profit hospitals compare uses of capital
across industries, whereas nonprofit hospitals
may be strongly committed to inpatient care.
Fourth, we find that the role of Medicare and
1. Ghemawat and Nalebuff assume that capacities
and production costs are common knowledge, unit costs
are constant, and fixed costs are proportional to capacity.
The basic insight for their result is that firms play a game
of attrition. As the demand continues to decline, the larger
plant cannot credibly commit to stay in the market for
a longer time than the smaller plant. By backward induc-
tion, the larger firm will exit as soon as the demand cannot
support more than one firm in the industry.
2. Gibson and Harris find that firms owning many
plants made plant-closing decisions that did not seem to
rely on relative production costs. This last piece of evi-
dence supports Whinston’s (1988) theory that multiplant
firms are able to internalize the benefits of a plant’s exit.
Wewill return on this point in our discussion of the results.
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Medicaid share of patients as determinants of
exit has changed over the 1990s. Early in the
1990s, higher Medicare and Medicaid pene-
tration led to an increased probability of exit,
but by the late 1990s this relationship had
disappeared.
II. METHODS
Hospital h decides whether to exit or re-
main in the market for inpatient services based
on whether expected profits exceed some
threshold, T:
EðphtÞ  TðMht;EsÞ;ð1Þ
where p denotes profit, the subscript t denotes
time, andMht reflects the objective, or mission,
of the hospital and is proxied by ownership.
For example, T(Mht, Est) for a for-profit hos-
pital would reflect the opportunity cost of cap-
ital across a wide range of industries, whereas
T(Mht, Est) at a nonprofit hospital may reflect
a mission to provide inpatient care. Est is the
‘‘external’’ long-run benefit to the other hos-
pitals owned by system s from shutting down
the inpatient operations of hospital h. It only
accrues to systems with multiple hospitals in
the same market, as in Whinston (1988).
Profit is modeled as a function of revenue,
R, and total operating costs, C:
pht ¼ f ðCht;Rht; Þ;ð2Þ
where Cht is the long-run cost of providing
care as measured by the American Hospital
Association.Rht is a function of the reimburse-
ment levels of the hospital, reflecting, for
example, payer mix. We parameterize Equa-
tion (1) as follows:
Closeht ¼ 1
if EðphtÞ  TðMht;EsÞ
¼ aþ bRRht þ bMMht þ bCCht
þ bEEht þ sh þ eht < 0
ð3Þ
Closeht ¼ 0
if EðphtÞ  TðMht;EsÞ
¼ aþ bRRht þ bMMht þ bCCht
þ bEEht þ sh þ eht  0;
where sh is a hospital-specific error component
that reflects fixed hospital characteristics, such
as age of plant and cost of capital andRht,Mht,
Cht and Eht are as already defined. Note uht ¼
sh þ eht is a combination of a hospital-specific
component and a temporally independently
identically distributed component, which are
by construction independent of each other.
eht is assumed to have a Weibull distribution,
F(eht) ¼ exp(exp(eht)), while sh ; N(0,r2t)
and r2U ¼1, and furthermore we assume that
there is no structural state dependence once
heterogeneity across hospitals has been taken
into account as shown in Heckman (1981a).
Under these conditions Equation 3 can be
modeled as:
Pðdht ¼ 1jXht; shÞ
¼ KðXhtbþ shÞ
¼ eXhtbþsh=ð1þ eXhtbþshÞ;
ð4Þ
where X includes all explanatory variables
in Equation (3). If we define h ¼ eXhtbþsh=
ð1þ eXhtbþshÞ then the distributional assump-
tion of s implies that we can integrate out the
individual hospital random effect, yielding:
Pðdht ¼ 1jXhtÞ
¼
ðþN
N
ðhÞes2h=2r2s ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ2pp rsds:
ð5Þ
The log likelihood function is then:
L ¼
XN
h¼1
log
ðþN
N
es
2
h
=2r2s
 ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
prs


YYendh
y¼Ystart
h
ðhÞdhð1 hÞ1dhds

:
ð6Þ
Here Ystarth is the first year the hospital
h appears in the data set. Yendh is the last year
the hospital appears in the data set. Hospitals
turn up in the data set at different times as
entry occurs, thus Y starth 6¼ 0 differs across hos-
pitals. This introduces the problem of nonex-
ogenous initial conditions. If the process has
been in operation prior to the time it is sam-
pled, and if the disturbances are serially depen-
dent, the initial conditions are not exogenous
variables and the exit/stay decision and the
entry decision are stochastically dependent
on sh. However, if no structural state depen-
dence is present once heterogeneity is properly
accounted for, and if the stochastic process
that drives the discrete choice random variable
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is stationary, then maximizing the log like-
lihood returns consistent estimates of the
parameters b.3
Note that the probability of exit at the
mean value of the control variables is ex-
tremely low in our sample (approximately
0.6%). Thus, the marginal effect of a change
in one of the independent variables on the
probability of closure is also very small. It is
more interesting to study the percentage
change in the probability of closure condi-
tional on a marginal change in the indepen-
dent variable, [(@P(dht ¼ 0jXht, sh))=P(dht ¼
0jXht, sh)]=@Xkht, which in this context is ap-
proximately equal to the coefficient estimates.
To see this note that [@P(d ¼ 0)=P(d ¼ 0)]=
@Xk¼ bk=[1þ exp(Xb)] and because the prob-
ability of exit is small, exp(Xb) is very close to
zero (i.e., the realizations of exit are far on
the left-hand side of the distribution). Thus
@P(d¼ 0)=P(d¼ 0) bk@Xk. For independent
variables in logged units the parameter esti-
mates are very close to elasticities. For other
variables measured in percentages we report
the effect of an X percentage point change
on the percentage change in the probability
of exit. We estimate Equation (6) using the en-
tire sample and separately for the 1989–93 and
1994–97 periods. We also estimate Equation
(6) using only urban hospitals, which are de-
finedbased on a locationwithin ametropolitan
statistical area (MSA).
The standard errors of Equation (6) are es-
timated using a bootstrap with clustering at
the hospital level. Thus in each draw the hos-
pitals are sampled accounting the fact that
hospitals appear in multiple years. This tech-
nique was suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004),
who show it yields more accurate standard
errors in a time-series context. We report stan-
dard errors based on 100 repetitions in the
tables. We performed a bootstrap with 500
repetitions on the urban subsample and found
that there were trivial differences in the stan-
dard errors if 100 versus 500 repetitions were
used. Thus we perform 100 repetitions for all
of the estimates.
III. DATA
The data set includes all nonfederal short-
term urban and rural general hospitals in the
American Hospital Association’s Annual Sur-
vey of Hospitals operating between 1989 and
1997. We identified closures using data from
American Hospital Association (AHA). We
followed up on the closures reported by the
AHA to confirm that the hospital did in fact
remain closed. There were several instances
where the AHA reported name changes as clo-
sures. In addition, we identified one case where
a hospital was reported as closed when in fact
it was only temporarily closed for remodeling.
We treated these hospitals as survivors in our
analysis. Overall, we identified 347 closures of
general short-term hospitals. A closure is de-
fined as a permanent elimination of general
inpatient bed capacity. Thus, for example, a
permanent conversion to a specialty hospital
is treated as a closure. Table 1 shows the total
number of closures over the time period. The
number of closures in the whole nation has
been declining over time, and closures were
more frequent prior to 1993. The closure rates
were close to 1% in 1989 and 1990 but decline
to 0.5%–0.7% in the latter half of the period.
IV. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
We derive a measure, which we call the rev-
enue premium, to represent the revenue each
hospital gets relative to it competitors within
the market. The revenue premium, denoted
Qˆdevh , is a proxy for quality and case-mix in
the analysis. We derive the revenue premium
as follows. First, we calculate net patient rev-
enue per adjusted admission using net patient
TABLE 1
Closures over Time
Year Open Closed
1989 5052 63
1990 4988 54
1991 4918 48
1992 4879 44
1993 4818 25
1994 4684 34
1995 4649 27
1996 4463 31
1997 4387 21
Total 347
3. To avoid the assumption of stationarity, Heckman
(1981b) proposes to use a fixed-effect model. In this con-
text, such a solution would not work because the only hos-
pitals in the restricted sample would be the hospitals that
exit the industry. Hospitals are present in the industry only
once—they do not re-enter the industry after exit.
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revenue data from theMedicare Cost Report.4
Second, we regress this variable on a hospital
fixed effect, hospital patient mix, case mix, and
hospital characteristics defined in Table 2
(with the exception of system membership,
number of sites, ownership, and location var-
iables) using our full data set. Prior to running
the regression, we transformed the variables
into deviations from the market mean for each
year to control for market-level fixed effects.
The revenue premium is the hospital fixed ef-
fect estimated in this regression. A large fixed
effect implies that the hospital is being reim-
bursed at a higher rate per admission, control-
ling for a variety of hospital characteristics,
including patient mix and case mix. The most
likely reasons for the relatively generous reim-
bursement are unobserved case mix and qual-
ity (clinical or nonclinical). Capps et al. (2003)
show that a hospital with attributes that are
attractive to patients will be reimbursed by
insurers at a higher rate than other hospitals
because patients demand the hospital to be in-
cluded in the insurance network. Among the
attributes that are attractive to patients are
clinical quality (e.g., favorable outcomes) and
nonclinical quality (e.g., nonclinical amenities,
such as private rooms or waterfalls in the
lobby). Location of the hospital will also affect
the attractiveness of the hospital to a group of
patients, as shown in Tay (2003). This variable
was previously used to control for unmeasured
differences in case mix/payment generosity in
Lindrooth et al. (2003).
Cht includes a measure of efficiency, denoted
Fˆdevh . This measure of efficiency is the hospital
fixed effect from the same specification used to
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
All
(n ¼ 43,185)
Exiting Hospitalsa
(n ¼ 1,395)
Surviving Hospitalsb
(n ¼ 41,790)
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Revenue premium (Qˆdevh ) 0.000 0.456 0.459 0.546 0.015 0.444
Efficiency (Fˆdevh ) 0.000 0.461 0.415 0.500 0.014 0.453
Ln(Cost) 16.880 1.383 15.903 1.301 16.913 1.374
Ln(Revenues) 16.851 1.425 15.757 1.397 16.888 1.412
System Membership 0.414 0.492 0.430 0.495 0.413 0.492
Number of Additional Sites 0.816 1.545 1.032 1.884 0.809 1.532
Log Beds 4.732 0.943 4.231 0.877 4.749 0.940
Capacity Utilization 0.552 0.191 0.465 0.221 0.555 0.189
% Medicare 0.398 0.149 0.423 0.198 0.398 0.147
% Medicaid 0.131 0.099 0.125 0.130 0.131 0.098
% ER 0.342 0.192 0.365 0.243 0.341 0.190
Have SNF 0.267 0.442 0.184 0.388 0.269 0.444
% LTC 0.015 0.042 0.020 0.064 0.015 0.041
% Outpatient 0.892 0.082 0.854 0.149 0.893 0.078
HMO Penetration 0.119 0.135 0.121 0.121 0.119 0.135
Profit 0.131 0.338 0.293 0.455 0.126 0.332
Nonfederal government 0.276 0.447 0.267 0.443 0.276 0.447
Teach 0.169 0.375 0.068 0.252 0.172 0.378
Urban 0.545 0.498 0.628 0.484 0.542 0.498
Medicare case mix 1.236 0.225 1.125 0.189 1.239 0.225
# High-tech services 3.304 2.427 1.786 1.871 3.355 2.427
Ln(income) 9.829 0.252 9.797 0.253 9.830 0.252
Ln(Population Density) 4.806 1.770 5.069 1.894 4.797 1.765
Post 0.536 0.499 0.277 0.447 0.544 0.498
aAll observations for hospitals that will exit the industry at some point in time.
bAll observations for hospitals that remain in the industry over the period of study.
4. Net patient revenue is total patient revenue net of
discounts and allowances for bad debt.
CILIBERTO & LINDROOTH: EXIT FROM THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY 75
calculate the revenue premium, except we re-
place net patient revenue with operating costs
from the Medicare Cost Report and include
system membership and the number of sites
as independent variables. This approach to
measuring efficiency was suggested by Skinner
(1994), and its attractiveness is due to less re-
strictive assumptions than data envelopment
analysis and stochastic frontier functions. In
particular, the validity of the stochastic fron-
tier model is based on zero skewness of the
random component of the cost residual be-
cause all of the skewness will be attributed
to inefficiency. However, the distribution of
unmeasured case mix is likely to be skewed
to the right, leading to potentially misleading
estimates that are exacerbated by the stringent
distribution assumptions.
We estimate the efficiency measure and the
revenue premium separately for the 1989–93
period and the 1994–97 period, and thus we
allow the measures to vary between the two
periods. Overall, nonprofit hospitals have the
highest revenue premium but are also the least
efficient. The lower efficiency score may be due
to unmeasured quality or case mix that is not
captured in our crude case mix measure. Thus,
alone the measure is an imperfect measure of
case mix, but because we also include the rev-
enue premium, which includes variation in un-
measured case mix and quality (insofar it is
reimbursed by payers), the coefficient estimate
on efficiency will be unbiased. For-profit hos-
pitals have the highest efficiency score, and
non–federal government hospitals have the
lowest revenue premium. The former result is
not surprising, and the latter result may be
due in part to fewer amenities and more char-
ity care at public hospitals.
Mht contains a dummy variable indicating
the hospital is for-profit, and another dummy
that indicates the hospital is a non–federal
government hospital. The excluded category
is nonprofit. In addition, we created a dummy
variable, Teach, which indicates whether the
hospitalwas amember of theCouncil of Teach-
ing Hospitals. All these variables are from the
AHA annual survey. Other hospital-level var-
iables that explain long-term costs and mea-
sure hospital heterogeneity include percent
skilled nursing care admissions (%SNC); per-
cent emergency room visits out of the total
outpatient visits (%ER); percent outpatient
visits out of the sum of outpatient visits and
inpatient admissions (% Outpatient); total
staffed beds (logged); Medicaid discharges/
inpatient admissions; Medicare discharges/
inpatient admissions and capacity utilization
(inpatient days/[beds365]), all of which are
calculated from the AHA data set. In addition
we use the Medicare case mix index computed
by the Health Care Financing Administration
(currently called Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services) and a measure of the avail-
ability and breadth of high-tech services, which
is a count of the following services: extra-
corporeal shock-wave lithotripter; computed
tomography scans; magnetic resonance imag-
ing; positron emission tomography; diagnostic
radioisotope; single photon emission comput-
erized tomography; radiation therapy; and
ultrasound.
Recall that Eht is the benefit of closure that
a system derives from closing one of its hospi-
talsmeasured by a categorical variable,System
Membership, which is equal to one if the hos-
pital is part of multihospital health care system
in a givenmarket.Eht also includes a count var-
iable, Number of Sites, which measures the
number of hospitals in the local market that
are part of the system to which the hospital
belongs. The variable Number of Sites is equal
to zero if the hospital is not part of a system.
Our market-level variables include HMO
penetration rates, which were calculated by al-
locating managed care enrollment to counties
based on the managed care service area, using
an approach developed by Wholey and col-
leagues (1997).5 HMO market penetration
rate is the number of HMO enrollees divided
by the resident population in the market. In
addition, we include market-level variables,
such as population density and per capita in-
come, calculated annually at theMSA level for
urban hospitals and at the county level for ru-
ral hospitals from the Area Resource File.
Finally, we construct a dummy variable
Post that divides the period 1989–97 in two
equal parts. The first part is 1989–93, and
the second is 1994–97. The unit of observation
in the regressions that follow is the short-term
general hospital. We used regression impu-
tation of total admissions (8.21% of the ob-
servations), births (9.15%), outpatient visits
(11.35%), Medicare discharges (16.68%),
Medicaid discharges (17.96%), long-term ad-
missions (8.21%), and case mix (2.06%). We
5. We thank Douglas Wholey for providing these
data.
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performed the analysis on a reduced sample of
hospitals with complete data, and the results
were very similar. Hence we only present the
results using the imputed values. After impu-
tation, we have 43,185 hospital-year observa-
tions for which there are complete information
on all dependent variables.
V. UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Table 3 shows the selected characteristics
of closed hospitals and survivors. Most of
the hospitals that closed were not-for-profit
(43.23%), but the percentage of not-for-profit
hospitals that did not close is higher (60.01%).
In contrast, the percentage of for-profit hospi-
tals that closed (28.24%) is double the percent-
age of those that did not close (14.84%).We do
not find any substantial difference with regard
to the government- and church-owned hospi-
tals. Furthermore, closures mostly occurred at
not-for-profit hospitals that were not teaching
hospitals. Only a few teaching hospitals closed,
with the percentage that closed (5.76%) being
one-third of the percentage of teaching hos-
pitals that remained open (18.42%). About
65% of the hospitals that closed were indepen-
dent hospitals (denoted ‘‘1 Site’’ in Table 3),
and 53.16% of the survivors were indepen-
dent. Hospitals that had multiple sites (i.e.,
system hospitals) generally comprised a larger
percentage of survivors than closures.
The summary statistics for all of the varia-
bles used in the analysis are in Table 2. The
first column presents the means and standard
deviations for all the hospital-year observa-
tions in the sample. The second column pres-
ents the same statistics for the hospitals that
close and uses each hospital-year observation
for the 347 closing hospitals. The third column
presents means and standard deviations for
the hospital that does not close. Ln(Costs),
Ln(Revenues), and Ln(Beds) are smaller for
closing hospitals than for those that survive.
In addition hospitals that survive are more
likely to provide skilled nursing care, offer
more high-tech services, and treat more com-
plex cases. Less than half of the hospital-year
observations are for hospitals that are not part
of a system over the time period we study. The
average number of additional sites is close to
one for exiting (1.032) and surviving hospitals
(0.809) if we consider all hospital-year obser-
vations. If we restrict the attention to the hos-
pitals that are part of a system we find that
Number of Sites is on average equal to 2.398
for exiting hospitals and 1.959 for surviving
hospitals.
We find that closures are more likely to
occur in urban areas with high population
density. We also observe that the generated
regressors of quality and efficiency are nega-
tive for the exiting hospitals, suggesting that
competitive pressure may push less efficient
and lower quality hospitals out of the market.
VI. RESULTS
The first column in Table 4 contains the
results of the random effect logit regression us-
ing the entire sample. The second and third
columns show the results for all hospitals in
the pre- and post-1994 periods, respectively.
Columns 4 and 5 display the results in the
pre- and post-1994 periods for the urban hos-
pital sample. We find that more generously re-
imbursed hospitals, as measured by Revenue
Premium, were less likely to exit throughout
the time period. More efficient hospitals were
also less likely to exit, though this result is
only significant in the entire sample and the
post-1994 samples. There is a similar trend
for hospitals with large percentages of skilled
nursing facility (SNF) patients. Larger percent-
ages of SNF patient had a large effect in the
post-1994 sample, but were insignificant in
the pre-1994 sample. In contrast, hospitals
with high Medicare shares were more likely
to exit in the pre-1994 sample, but the coeffi-
cient is much smaller and statistically insignif-
icant in the post 1994 sample.
TABLE 3
Selected Characteristics of Closures and
Survivors
Type
% of Closures
(n ¼ 347)
% of Survivors
(n ¼ 5,081)
For Profit 28.24 14.84
Government 28.53 25.15
NFP 43.23 60.01
Teaching 5.76 18.42
1 Site 64.55 53.16
2 Sites 17.87 24.76
3 Sites 6.34 8.03
4 Sites 3.75 4.17
5 Sites 2.88 3.48
>5 Sites 3.46 6.4
Urban 59.65 55.95
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Hospitals in a large system, as measured by
the Number of Hospitals variable, were more
likely to exit, and the effect is consistent across
time periods, though it is marginally insig-
nificant in the pre-1994 sample of all hospi-
tals. Large hospitals were less likely to exit
TABLE 4
Results of Analysis of Closure
All Hospitals Urban Hospitals
Variable 1988–97 1989–93 1994–97 1989–93 1994–97
Efficiency 1.925** 2.015 2.233*** 1.124 2.421***
(0.831) (1.783) (0.727) (1.701) (0.778)
Revenue Premium 3.099*** 3.407** 2.915*** 2.782* 2.870***
(0.791) (1.614) (0.724) (1.602) (0.699)
System 0.292 0.065 0.585* 0.175 0.600
(0.207) (0.258) (0.312) (0.423) (0.364)
Number of Hospitals 0.119** 0.144 0.093* 0.102 0.073
(0.057) (0.097) (0.055) (0.122) (0.072)
Total Beds 0.369** 0.214 0.494** 0.030 0.561**
(0.146) (0.259) (0.206) (0.257) (0.258)
Occupancy Rate 0.585 0.883 0.122 1.477 0.760
(0.523) (0.705) (0.728) (1.029) (0.984)
Percent Medicare 1.124*** 1.415*** 0.467 0.916 0.147
(0.421) (0.521) (0.764) (0.823) (0.995)
Percent Medicaid 0.917 1.194 0.166 1.602 0.061
(0.744) (0.889) (1.017) (1.003) (1.185)
Percent ED 0.058 0.464 0.673 0.856 0.920
(0.332) (0.408) (0.494) (0.668) (0.703)
Have SNF 0.238 0.080 0.406 0.308 0.033
(0.261) (0.345) (0.325) (0.453) (0.366)
Percent SNF 3.681*** 0.020 4.930*** 1.192 4.230**
(1.098) (2.993) (1.020) (5.853) (2.105)
Percent Outpatient 1.461*** 1.565** 1.274** 1.579 1.426
(0.526) (0.695) (0.631) (0.966) (0.913)
HMO Penetration 0.403 0.330 0.010 0.881 0.381
(0.815) (1.365) (1.007) (1.720) (0.981)
For-profit 0.707*** 0.496** 1.038*** 0.381 0.882**
(0.218) (0.245) (0.305) (0.325) (0.363)
Public 0.184 0.234 0.114 0.505 0.452
(0.166) (0.229) (0.243) (0.378) (0.412)
Teach 0.563* 0.141 0.566 0.172 0.570
(0.296) (2.116) (0.409) (3.567) (0.449)
Case Mix 0.569 0.573 0.877 0.312 0.729
(0.576) (0.998) (0.729) (1.126) (0.740)
Tech Services 0.349*** 0.464*** 0.241*** 0.314*** 0.232***
(0.049) (0.080) (0.064) (0.104) (0.075)
Per Capita Income 0.571 0.454 0.923 0.714 0.800
(0.419) (0.468) (0.638) (1.036) (0.838)
Population Density 0.265*** 0.303*** 0.186 0.216 0.313*
(0.090) (0.115) (0.138) (0.173) (0.183)
Urban 0.258 0.744** 0.634* N/A N/A
(0.268) (0.299) (0.372)
Post 0.578*** N/A N/A N/A N/A
(0.158)
Constant 7.640* 6.723 11.064* 10.221 8.620
(4.113) (4.522) (6.439) (9.420) (8.637)
N 43,185 20,046 23,139 12,524 10,995
Notes: Bootstrapped SEs in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 based on a two-sided test. All the regres-
sions include region dummies.
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throughout the period, though the parameter
estimate is only significant in the post-1994
sample. Finally, hospitals that had higher
shares of outpatient visits and more high-tech
services were less likely to exit throughout the
time period, although the outpatient coeffi-
cients are marginally insignificant in the ur-
ban only sample.
If we consider a 10% change from the aver-
age value of efficiency and the revenue pre-
mium we find that an increase in Efficiency
of 10% decreases the probability of exit of the
hospital by approximately 19.25% and that
a 10% increase in Revenue Premium decreases
the probability of exit (at the mean values) of
the hospital by about 30.99%.6 The magnitude
of the effect of Efficiency increases from
11.24% to 24.21% in the latter half of the
period for urban hospitals. In comparison,
the effect of the Revenue Premium is relative
constant over the time period.
Note that the actual percentage of observa-
tions of closed hospitals is very small, thus the
model is a much better at predicting hospitals
that do not exit than those that exit. A closer
analysis of the correlation between predicted
and actual outcomes confirms this conjecture.7
To further analyze whether there is serial
correlation in the sample, we estimate q ¼
r2s=ðr2s þ 1Þ, the proportion of total variance
contributed by the panel-level variance com-
ponent. We find that q is significantly different
from zero, in all specifications, which is evi-
dence that there is serial correlation in the
sample and lends support to the random
effects logit specification.
VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
We also separately estimated an ordinary
logit model and a random-effects logit model
where we created the Efficiency and Revenue
Premium so that they are constant over the en-
tire time period, rather than allowing them to
vary between the pre- and post-1994 periods.
The results are remarkably consistent with
column 1 of Table 4. In addition, we ran the
following regressions with logged costs and
revenues as deviations from the local mar-
ket averages replacing the generated regres-
sors of revenue premium and efficiency: a
random-effects logit; a between-effect logit re-
gression; and a conditional fixed-effects logit.
The between-effect logit regression studies
the probability that a hospital closes condi-
tional on the long-termvalues of the regressors.
The conditional logit regression restricts the
analysis to those hospitals that eventually
closed over the time period. The conditional
logit regression estimates the probability that
a hospital will close at time t þ 1 conditional
on the hospital being open at time t, condi-
tional on the fact that the hospital will close
at some point in time, and conditional on the
particular values of the regressors. The con-
ditional logit specification uses within hospi-
tal variation for the closing hospitals and
thus helps determine which variables deter-
mine the time of exit. We use the measures
of revenues and costs rather than Qˆdevh and
Fˆ devh because they vary over time.
If the sample is truly random, then the three
regressions should give the same results. If
the results differ across regressions, then we
should be concerned with the possibility that
our baseline specification is biased. Overall
the results suggest that the main results in
Table 4 are robust to these changes. In partic-
ular, the coefficients on Revenue, Costs, Sys-
tem, Number of Hospitals, Total Beds, %
Medicare; % SNF; % Outpatient; For-profit;
and Tech Services are of the same sign as
Table 4, and generally significant. However,
if the coefficient is not close statistical signifi-
cance in Table 4, the qualitative conclusions
vary across specifications. Thus in our discus-
sion we focus on the effects that are at or near
statistical significance. In summary, the qual-
itative conclusions drawn from the main pre-
vious results are not affected by bias, though
we are unable to determine to what extent the
magnitude of the coefficients may be affected
by bias. The results of these specifications are
available from the authors on request.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In every specification we find that low–
revenue premium hospitals are more likely
to exit. Although this result is unsurprising,
6. Fˆdevh measures the percentage deviation in terms of
efficiency of the hospital from the local market efficiency
mean. In particular, in our fixed-effects regression, Fˆdevh is
the percentage deviation of the hospital’s costs from the
constant term that is not explained by the control variables
because the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
costs.
7. The results of the correlation analysis are available
from the authors.
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it is important to consider that variation in the
revenue premium is from attributes of the hos-
pital that are difficult for managers to change
in the short run: location, amenities, and rep-
utation. Managers are likely to be better able
to influence efficiency and the effect of effi-
ciency is largely concentrated in the latter half
of the period. Private insurers increased the
incentives to hospitals to lower costs through
managed care, during the mid- to late 1990s.
Our analysis suggests that this shift rewarded
efficient hospitals at the expense of inefficient
hospitals. This conclusion is strengthened by
the fact that when we include a variable in
the post-1994 analysis that indicates whether
a hospital’s efficiency increased between pre-
and post-1994, the coefficient was statistically
significant and positive, indicating that hospi-
tals with improved efficiency were more likely
to survive. Thus, improving efficiency is corre-
lated with better survival prospects condi-
tional on the level.
These results lend credence to the notion
that exit from the hospital industry is orderly
in that the less efficient hospitals exit first, and
that payment incentives were consistent with
this in the latter half of the 1990s. Conditional
on efficiency, we also consistently find that
for-profit hospitals are more likely to exit.
Whereas others have also identified this rela-
tionship, we are the first to do so controlling
for efficiency and the revenue premium. Al-
though this result is not surprising, it lends
further evidence that for-profit hospitals com-
pare the uses of capital across industries and
reallocate the capital as economic conditions
warrant.
The results also reveal the value of diversi-
fication into outpatient and high-tech services.
Hospitals with a relatively large share of out-
patient visits and more high-tech services were
less likely to exit. However, higher shares of
SNF patients dramatically increased the prob-
ability of exit in the latter half of the period,
though for the vast majority of hospitals the
percentage of SNF patients was not large
enough to overwhelm the Have SNF coeffi-
cient. Thus the existence of a SNF alone is
not a predictor of exit. The Balanced Budget
Act of 1997 included a provision to shiftMedi-
care reimbursement of skilled nursing care
from cost-based to prospective reimburse-
ment. This provision was expected to hurt
hospitals with large SNF populations, in par-
ticular. It is beyond the scope of our analysis
to test whether the anticipation of SNF provi-
sion in the act led to the larger exit probabil-
ities of hospitals with large SNF population
that we observe in the latter half of the 1990s.
The percent of Medicare patients increases
the probability of exit in the pre-1994 period
but is significantly lower and insignificant in
the post period. This result is likely due to
two reasons. First, it could be a residual effect
of the shift from cost-based to prospective
payment. All of the hospitals that did not
adapt to prospective payment exited the mar-
ket by 1993. By 1994, only the hospitals that
could manage prospective payment stayed in
business. Second, the relative generosity of
Medicare payment increased during the time
period. As already mentioned, private payers
were ratcheting down payment throughout
the 1990s, whereas Medicare stayed relatively
constant. In contrast, Medicaid share is insig-
nificant in all specification and switches sign in
the pre- and post-1994 urban specification.
In summary, our results suggest that exit
from the hospital industry is orderly. Hospi-
tals that are in a position to attract more gen-
erous reimbursement (whether it is due to
location, amenities, or quality) are more likely
to survive. Smaller, undiversified, inefficient
hospitals are likely to be the first to leave the
market when conditions become unfavorable.
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